Monday, March 9, 2015

The Incomplete Manifesto of Growth

Who is Bruce Mau? 
Bruce Mau is a Canadian designer. From 1985-2010, Mau was the creative director of Bruce Mau Design (BMD), and the founder of the Institute without Boundaries. In 2010 Mau went on to establish The Massive Change Network in Chicago. He started as a graphic designer but later veered his career towards the worlds of architecture, art, museums, film, eco-environmental design, and conceptual philosophy.





Mantra for the Week: 

Slow Down: Desynchronize from standard time frames and
surprising opportunities may present themselves.


Why?
I chose this mantra because some days I feel like I am just rushing to get things done without enjoying what I am doing. By slowing down and allowing to let myself enjoy the day I can promote creativity and give myself space to think openly and freely.



Chip Kidd

 Chip Kidd is an American author, editor, and graphic designer, best known for his innovative book covers. I found Chip Kidd's Ted talk inspiring and uplifting. His fun approach to design reminds me what being a designer is supposed to be. His designs are also original and based around the story, making the book cover a piece of the literature seamlessly.
In the video Chip Kidd Explains His Process, Chip Kidd runs through the process of designing a book cover for "You Better Not Cry." After much back and forth with the publisher, his designs are not published and they "solve it in house." His designs for this project were clever and beautiful. This video gave an inside look into publishing and showed that even if you think you have nailed something, not everyone is going to like it, and even though this can happen, you should still love your own work.




Links:

http://www.ted.com/talks/chip_kidd_designing_books_is_no_laughing_matter_ok_it_is
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HGunvu4T5kU

Monday, March 2, 2015

Poster+ Comprehension Research

TASK:

Using a provided social poster as a starting point, design a printed or digital annotation that would accompany the poster while on display at the "graphic advocacy" exhibit.  the annotation should deepen the audience’s understanding of the complexities of the issue and concretely communicate multiple facts about the issue and in so doing, generate empathy for the issue in the mind of the audience.




COMPREHENSION RESEARCH:

·      Annotation: An annotation is a summary and/or evaluation. Therefore, an annotated bibliography includes a summary and/or evaluation of each of the sources. Depending on your project or the assignment, your annotations may do one or more of the following. Summarize: Some annotations merely summarize the source
·      Logos (Logical): means persuading by the use of reasoning.
·      Pathos (Emotional): means persuading by appealing to the reader's emotions.
·      Empathy: the ability to understand and share the feelings of another
·      Empathetic: Empathetic is a recent term; it comes from empathy, which was coined by the German philosopher Rudolf Lotze in 1858. Lotze believed that when you look at a work of art, you project your own sensibilities onto it.
·      Idea of Receptivity Gradient: Ready to know – knows facts because I am not sure what range of Americans know or remember this issue and those who do know may not accept it as a large issue and may view it as a one time occurrence

Poster+ Research


RESEARCH

            After Hurricane Katrina the government was criticized for its slow response The criticism of the government response to Hurricane Katrina consisted primarily of condemnations of mismanagement and lack of preparation. This criticism was Criticism was prompted largely by televised images of visibly shaken and frustrated political leaders, and of residents who remained in New Orleans without water, food or shelter, and the deaths of several citizens by thirst, exhaustion, and violence days after the storm itself had passed. The treatment of people who had evacuated to registered facilities such as the Superdome was also criticized.
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin was also criticized for failing to implement his evacuation plan and for ordering residents to a shelter of last resort without any provisions for food, water, security, or sanitary conditions. The most important criticism of Nagin is that he delayed his emergency evacuation order until less than a day before landfall, which led to hundreds of deaths of people who (by that time) could not find any way out of the city. Adding to the criticism was the broadcast of school bus parking lots full of yellow school buses, which Mayor Nagin refused to be used in evacuation. When asked why the buses were not used to assist evacuations instead of holing up in the Superdome, Nagin cited the lack of insurance liability and shortage of bus drivers.
September 26, 2005 hearing, former FEMA chief Michael Brown testified before a U.S. House subcommittee about FEMA's response. During that hearing, Representative Stephen Buyer (R-IN) inquired as to why President Bush's declaration of state of emergency of August 27 had not included the coastal parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and Plaquemines. (In fact, the declaration did not include any of Louisiana's coastal parishes; rather, they were included in the declarations for Mississippi and Alabama.) Brown testified that this was because Louisiana Governor Blanco had not included those parishes in her initial request for aid, a decision that he found "shocking."  
New Orleans was already one of the poorest metropolitan areas in the United States in 2005, with the eighth-lowest median income ($30,771). At 24.5 percent, Orleans Parish had the sixth-highest poverty rate among U.S. counties or county equivalents. The 2000 U.S. census revealed that 27% of New Orleans households, amounting to approximately 120,000 people, were without private mobility. Despite these factors preventing many people from being able to evacuate on their own, the mandatory evacuation called on August 28 made no provisions to evacuate homeless, low-income, or sick individuals, nor the city's elderly or infirm residents. Consequently most of those stranded in the city were the poor, the elderly, and the sick.
President Bush signed a $10.5 billion relief package within four days of the hurricane, and ordered 7,200 active-duty troops to assist with relief efforts. However, some members of the United States Congress charged that the relief efforts were slow because most of the affected areas were poor. There was also concern that many National Guard units were short staffed in surrounding states because some units were deployed overseas and local recruiting efforts in schools and the community had been hampered making reserves less than ideal.
On September 13, 2005, a memo was leaked that indicated that Chertoff issued 36 hours after the hurricane's landfall which read, in part, "As you know, the President has established the `White House Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Response.' He will meet with us tomorrow to launch this effort. The Department of Homeland Security, along with other Departments, will be part of the task force and will assist the Administration with its response to Hurricane Katrina." The memo activated the National Response Plan and made Michael D. Brown responsible for federal action.
FEMA was accused of deliberately slowing things down, in an effort to ensure that all assistance and relief workers were coordinated properly. FEMA also interfered in the Astor Hotel's' plans to hire 10 buses to carry approximately 500 guests to higher ground. Federal officials commandeered the buses, and told the guests to join thousands of other evacuees at the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center. FEMA officials turned away three Wal-Mart trailer trucks loaded with water, prevented the Coast Guard from delivering 1,000 gallons of diesel fuel, and on Saturday they cut the Jefferson Parish emergency communications line, leading the sheriff to restore it and post armed guards to protect it from FEMA. The Wal-Mart delivery had actually been turned away a week earlier, on Sunday, August 28, before the hurricane struck. Additionally, more than 50 civilian aircraft responding to separate requests for evacuations from hospitals and other agencies swarmed to the area a day after Katrina hit, but FEMA blocked their efforts. Aircraft operators complained that FEMA waved off a number of evacuation attempts, saying the rescuers were not authorized. "Many planes and helicopters simply sat idle," said Thomas Judge, president of the Assn. of Air Medical Service
Due to the slow response to the hurricane, New Orleans's top emergency management official called the effort a "national disgrace" and questioned when reinforcements would actually reach the increasingly desperate city. New Orleans's emergency operations chief Terry Ebbert blamed the inadequate response on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). "This is not a FEMA operation. I haven't seen a single FEMA guy", he said. "FEMA has been here three days, yet there is no command and control. We can send massive amounts of aid to tsunami victims, but we can't bail out the city of New Orleans.


Sources: